Turkish attacks in Northern Iraq

The Turkish military was on the brink of initiating a full scale military operation in Northern Iraq back in October but appeared to back down as a result of intense US diplomatic interventions. The visible US concessions to the Turks were that the Armenian genocide resolutions in the US house of representatives was scraped and the US declared the Kurdish enemies of Turkey as enemies of the United States. Aside from the situation in Iraq, the military which represents the secular political power in Turkey was on the brink of yet another military coup to stave off the growing Islamist political power in government. The Europeans applied pressure to prevent that intervention and so the new, ex-Islamist, Turkish president was sworn in despite the objections of the military.

The ex-Islamists in charge of the current Turkish government counted their blessings as the soldiers stayed in their barracks but there is an undeniable sense of urgency on their part to show unconditional support for the military establishment when it comes to attacking the Kurdish rebels. This appeasement phase by the Islamists in Turkey means that the military has a free hand in Northern Iraq as long as they can convince the US to allow operations there.

The recent smaller scale Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq seem to indicate that a deal was struck, back in October, with the US to allow just such operations both for security reasons and to allow the Turkish military to save face and continue to appear relevant in Turkish politics. A show of power by the Turkish military is needed after the events of 2007. Any legitimate oppositions to such operation on the part of the Turkish civilian government would be seen as unpatriotic and give the Turkish seculars an excuse to use the military to oust the Islamists in control of government in Ankara.

We should expect continued Turkish military operations for some time to come but the question now is: how long would can Iraqi politicians turn a blind eye for such operations? The Iraqi military and government view such operations as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty regardless of who is being targeted. The Iraqi Kurds also see these operations as the first indicators that the alliance with the United States has its limits and the Kurds could potentially be sold out if the political and military fortunes change. They are sensitive to this as every Alley they ever had eventually shifted alliance sooner or later through out their history.

The ultimate solution for all would be to come to a political settlement between the Turks and their own Turkish minority (including the rebels). The obstacles to the political settlement include the hard line Kurdish rebels who see independence as the only solution, and on the other side, the Turkish ultra nationalists in the military apparatus who see any negotiations with Kurds as treasonous and a clear threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey.

Below is an excerpt from "Iraq decoded" about the Kurdistan region written in Dec. 2006.(Photos and maps not included here)

Chapter 9. Kurds and Kurdistan

Iraqi Kurds and their politics are probably the most difficult for outsiders to decipher. Most people, including those in the region, know very little about their politics, so Americans can feel better about their less-than-complete understanding of Kurdish issues. Many Americans may be surprised to know that Kurds are mostly Sunni. They are, of course, allied with the Iraqi Shiite Arabs who are, in turn, allied with Iran who is opposed to Kurdish independence or stronger autonomy. The Shiites and the Kurds are unified by their historical suffering under Saddam’s regime, which was supported mostly by the minority Sunni Arab population.

It is important to realize that the Kurds reside in four countries as a significant minority: Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. This has made it impossible for them to gain autonomous rule or even equal rights in any of them. Such rights in any of these countries are viewed by regional governments as bad precedents which could threaten their territorial integrity. Iran is not only against Kurdish autonomy in Iran, but is also against Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. They consider the latter to be the first step in empowering the Kurds with more rights across the borders. Each of these four countries feels that their own Kurdish minority would demand the same rights afforded the Kurds in the neighboring countries. This has lead to a cycle of interference across borders and a divide-and-concur policy being taken by all sides.

For decades, the Iranians have prevented their resident Kurds from gaining autonomy, while at the same time supporting the Iraqi Kurdish independence movement. This support was not intended to allow the Iraqi Kurds to succeed in gaining their independence but, rather, to destabilize Iraq enough to give Iran a strategic advantage. This same strategy was true of the Iraqi government who supported Iranian Kurds against the Iranian regime. This dynamic preceded Khomeini and Saddam, and is almost a tradition in this part of the world. The cross-border assistance for the Kurdish armed movements resulted in a perpetual state of conflict with no one having an interest in a final settlement. Simultaneously, the Iraqi Kurds were constantly fighting each other as they were divided by their various supporters. The only real friends of the Kurds were the rugged Kurdish mountains. They provided safety against the various attacking armies and allowed them to survive Saddam and others.

The conflict between Saddam and the United States presented a historical breakthrough for the Iraqi Kurds. The establishment of the no-fly zone after the first Gulf war and, later, the alliance with the US during the second Gulf war allowed the Iraqi Kurds to achieve an unprecedented level of independence from the Iraqi central government. In fact, they are now a de facto independent state with their own flag, constitution, and government. This was the only true, unconditional assistance the Kurds received from any country. Kurds in Iraq made the best of this American support and turned their region around economically and politically. This Iraqi Kurdish success story, however, presents a constant threat to all the neighboring countries with a Kurdish minority of their own.

Iran is especially concerned not only because it has a large Kurdish minority sitting at the northwestern border with Iraq, but also because it has other minorities including an Arab minority dominating the oil rich province of Khuzestan (previously known as Arabistan during the Qajar and Safavid Persian dynasties). More Kurdish rights in Iran might embolden the Arabs in Iran to demand more rights in Khuzestan. Such a scenario would threaten Iranian strategic interests in this oil-rich region. Other considerations include Iran’s other minorities, including the Sunni Balouchi minority with strong cross-border ties to Pakistan and Afghanistan and the site of a recent attack (Feb. 2007) on Iranian “Basij” forces, who are considered the Islamic regime’s private army.

The Iraqi Shiites, allied with Iran and jealous of Kurdish control of the northern oil field, are also opposed to Iraqi Kurdish independence. The only reason Iraqi Shiites are going along with the federalism idea now is that, in the short run, they will gain more control of the southern oil fields. They are undoubtedly thinking they can deal with Kurdistan later . . . much later, like when the US is completely out of Iraq. The Sunni Arabs in Iraq are also opposed to Kurdish autonomy. They see the Kurdish oil fields as part of their national treasure; any Kurdish autonomy is considered a first step towards the theft of those resources resulting in further isolating the Sunnis in the poorest region of Iraq. The Sunnis may have the desert, but that desert has much less oil in it than the other regions.

The Sunni Arabs also suspect that the Shiite-dominated central government will do little to explore and develop the small oil fields in the Sunni region. It is no surprise that the first forceful voice against the Iraq study group findings and conclusions was the (Kurdish) Iraqi president Mr. Jalal Talebani. He understood the implications of peace with Iran and the impact of pulling American troops out of Iraq—and along with it the American support to the Kurds.

The Kurds are showing signs of wanting even more than autonomy at this stage. With Saddam’s regime toppled and replaced by a weak central government in Baghdad, it is hard to blame them for becoming politically greedy. They are pushing hard to secure a lion’s share of the oil revenues in their own region, raising the stakes for the other Iraqi factions who are already opposed to Kurdish independence. The Kurds have also pushed to turn the idea of Iraqi Federalism into a de facto declaration of independence, promoting a weak central government in Baghdad. This would leave Kurdistan with significant local powers, including their own independent military power. The Kurds retain in active service Iraq’s best trained and most cohesive forces, in the form of the Kurdish Peshmerga militias. Iraqi Kurdish TV stations broadcast Kurdish news and programs to the Kurds across the border making Iranians and Turks very uneasy. Iran and Turkey can no longer move against their own Kurdish minority without attracting the attention of the Iraqi Kurdish media, who would broadcast the Kurdish point of view to the rest of the world.

Ironically, when we speak of democracy, improved human rights, and minority rights in the region, we forget that if the Iraqi Kurds don’t manage their current gains well, they will put at risk the ambitions for equality of all minorities in the region. The problem is that the Iraqi Kurds can now see an easy path to independence—and they might just take it. In so doing, they would give credence to the argument that if minorities are given more rights, they will use them to gain even more independence and perhaps threaten the countries’ territorial integrity.

When John Kerry and Senator Biden commented in 2006 that all options are on the table, including dividing Iraq up into separate regions, they may have failed to realize the true impact of such policies on the entire region or their impact on the path towards freedom and equality for the many minorities there. If a minority is considered by the rest of the country as a threat to national security and territorial integrity, that minority can expect more persecution. Neighboring countries will tighten their grip and the pursuit of freedom and minority rights will suffer a setback for decades. The US policy should first focus on “do no harm,” when it comes to minorities in Iraq. We should also care, because whatever we do in error, will come back and bite us sooner or later. President Bush may be wrong in thinking that democracy can be exported in a neat package. Yet, he would be right in thinking that US military and political actions in the region can promote civil rights trends that would eventually lead to flourishing homegrown democracies. If the US can prove that granting the Iraqi Kurds more rights won’t
result in the disintegration of Iraq, we would then have succeeded in advancing the pursuit of freedom for all minorities in Iraq and the region.

Americans policies in Iraq, regardless of other agendas, should ensure that any support to Iraq and the regional countries is linked to the rights they afford their people, and especially their minorities. There is no better way to ensure civil and human rights for the entire population than to aim to protect its most vulnerable, the minorities. The US itself offers a perfect example of success in that regard. When the civil rights movement succeeded in passing laws protecting
minorities, they impacted the rights of all Americans of all genders, ages, and races. They even helped to reduce the plight of gay Americans years later.

Democracy takes time to fully blossom in a society. Still it needs to be on the right path, with attention paid to the little, seemingly unrelated issues which could have an impact in the long run. Elections are not all a democracy needs; a commitment to minority rights offers the guarantee for the right to cast votes, the right to freedom of speech, and the right to elect local officials.

Iran has held elections for many years. That criterion alone doesn’t constitute a democracy. In fact, the very existence of elections in Iran provides the Iraqis with the wrong example of a democracy. It is actually an illusion of democracy. People outside Iran don’t realize that, while being able to cast their votes, Iranians lack the right to become candidates unless they are vetted by the central government. Iranians can vote, but they can only choose between cleric
number one and cleric number two. There is not a single city in Iran that can elect its own mayor, because that post is considered a threat to central governmental control. Thus, all mayors are appointed by the government in Tehran. In minority cities, voters don’t even get to choose the city name (changed at will by the central government to water down ethnic identities).

These cities’ appointed mayors often come from elsewhere and from a different sect to insure their detachment from the local population. Obviously, if we allow such “little things” to remain uncontested in Iraq, as in Iran, then we are leading the Middle East on a path away from democracy.

We can protect our interests in Iraq while being the nice guys, which includes being tough on our friends like the Kurds if the need arises. Maybe being the nice guy is the only true way left for us to save the situation in Iraq and be able to complete this mission.

When one looks at the long-term picture for the region, it is apparent that the only spot in the Middle East where there is an incentive to welcome US military bases is Iraqi Kurdistan. Such presence would be welcome on a long-term basis and may be considered a Kurdish national security objective. US presence would provide a way for the Kurds to preserve what they gained in political independence and civil rights over the past 15 years as well as a way to inoculate themselves against future attacks by Iran or Turkey. Despite its desperation for such unconditional bases, the US should not miss this opportunity to set long-term conditions with the Kurds for promoting regional stability and fostering democracy. Such conditions would ultimately serve both US and Kurdish long-term strategic interests. Preserving human rights, curbing corruption, integrating militias with the army, and setting limits on the Kurdish independence ambitions would be objectives to consider.

Arrogant political actions in Iraqi Kurdistan will not be tolerated forever. The Iranians and Turks have time on their side and, before they know it, the Kurds will be back where they started. Under the right conditions, the US can have stable bases in the vicinity while pulling out of hot spots in Iraq. We can accomplish that while promoting, on a long-term basis, human rights issues, the rule of law, and democracy in the region.

All this may all be academic as of now, considering that the January 2007 unilateral US military operation against Iranian officials and diplomatic offices in Iraqi Kurdistan has demonstrated a decision-making process that is short-sighted and focuses only on carrying out security operations without any strategic considerations. To the average Kurd, this kind of unilateral action demonstrates that any US presence in Kurdistan will not constitute an allied presence but instead, one of an overseer. The US must begin acting more like an ally and less like a master in Iraq, including in Kurdistan. We can go after the Iranians in Kurdistan if we must, but need to do so with Kurdish blessing or at least last-minute knowledge.

As the US is working on an exit strategy, the old alliances in Kurdistan are reemerging. Any vacuum left by the Americans will leave doors open for these old alliances to reconsolidate and would likely lead to infighting in Kurdistan. All regional powers would benefit from such infighting, including the central government in Iraq. If we are going to change the political and military dynamics in Kurdistan, we need to cultivate an unbreakable strategic alliance, one that
needs to appear to be a partnership. This partnership would be based on mutual respect and national interests versus a master/subservient relationship that would cease as soon as US interests change or the US forces leave.

In the absence of a US stabilizing presence in Kurdistan, it would only be a matter of time before Turkey began conducting military operations in Kurdistan to pursue Kurdish rebels and separatists fighting in southern Turkey or in pursuit of those who support them in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iranians would do the same, pursuing Iranian Kurdish nationalists and their supporters in Iraq. Historically, both countries have conducted such operations, though these actions were never large-scale due to the balance of powers in place during Saddam’s regime. With a weak Iraqi government and army, such Turkish or Iranian incursions in Iraq would go unchecked and potentially escalate into a much larger conflict than previously witnessed. The absence of intrinsic or political factors limiting the scope and duration of such operations would destabilize the entire region. Ultimately, if left unchecked, this situation would become unpredictable and could, at the very least, stop the flow of oil from that region.

Politically, this scenario could beget endless infighting and outside political interference from regional powers. Further, the Kurdish people would continue to suffer in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Again, it is in the US national best interest to stay in Kurdistan as much as it behooves the Kurdish national interest. Over time, the US presence will encourage dialogue and promote political solutions for the Kurdish problems in all regional countries, as it would eliminate the need for regional military intervention as a means to subdue the Kurds. The people of the Middle East also stand to benefit: policies and laws designed to protect minorities will also protect individual rights for all citizens. Even the Turks can benefit from such a US strategy in Kurdistan; they would be motivated to reach a political settlement with their own Kurdish minority and militias. In doing so, the Turks can improve their human rights record and public image, a first real step towards aEuropean Union membership . . . a goal supported by the United States.